



In summer 2010, the world championship for men’s national soccer teams was 
held in South Africa, the country that after many years of painful struggle pre-
vailed over Apartheid. Spain won the tournament, but the revelation was Germany. 
Although Germany’s is historically one of the most successful national teams, the 
calculating,  unimaginative way the team used to play was not always much appre-
ciated. Throughout the 2010 tournament, however, Germany impressed fans by 
playing an attractive, aggressive soccer game. After the rousing 4-1 victory over 
England, the Welt am Sonntag (Frommann 2010) exclaimed, “With courage and 
strength the German footballers were knocking on the gates of heaven. The happy 
ending for the midsummer fairy tale is getting closer.” The team, interestingly enough, 
represented the new, multicultural Germany. Five players were born outside the 
country (in Poland, Yugoslavia, and Brazil), one had dual German-Ghanaian nation-
ality, and several others were second-generation immigrants of Nigerian, Spanish, 
Tunisian, and Turkish origin. Christian Seifert, Ceo of the German Football League, 
was jubilant: “[Germany] is a multi-cultural society where people come, where peo-
ple live, where people love to be, and the national team as you see it is very different 
from those of former days. In 1998, all those who played for Germany had German 
parents. Right now we have a lot of players with migrant backgrounds. . . . So, 
today’s German national team is proof of the success of the German national model” 
(Goal 2010).
Later that summer, German Bundeskanzler Angela Merkel made a public 
statement saying that the attempts to build a multicultural society in Germany 
had “utterly failed.” Her comments came amid an intense debate about immigra-
tion and multiculturalism or, to be more precise, the death of Multikulti. The 
polemic first heated up in August when a former Social Democratic senator and 
senior official at Germany’s central bank, Thilo Sarrazin, published a book with 
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the provocative title Deutschland schabt sich ab (Germany Is Digging Its Own 
Grave) (2010). He stated that “no immigrant group other than Muslims is so 
strongly connected with claims on the welfare state and crime.” These immigrant 
groups would be unwilling and incapable of integrating into the mainstream, 
something that according to Sarrazin would be due to their gene pool. Many peo-
ple were appalled to hear such statements 65 years after World War II and accused 
him of racism and anti-Semitism. But the senator has already sold more than one 
million copies of the book. Furthermore, various surveys showed that approximate-
ly one-third of the German population believed the country had been “overrun by 
foreigners.” Meanwhile, anti-immigrant political parties (initially Die Republikaner 
and later Die Freiheit) had been carving out a niche in the German electoral market, 
while mainstream parties, the Christian Democrats in particular, had become 
anxious about their electoral position. One really wonders how it is possible that 
the country that enthusiastically embraced multiculturalism during the World 
Cup condemned it so loudly less than three months later. So much for the mid-
summer fairy tale.
Germany is apparently confused about immigration and its resulting ethnic and 
religious diversity. Two years later, at the European championships, the German 
soccer team failed to qualify for the finals again. This time the popular German news-
paper Bild (2012) struck a different tone, arguing that the players with immigrant 
backgrounds were to blame for this failure, as they refrained from singing the na -
tional anthem. But Germany is not the only country experiencing this: we are wit-
nessing similar situations in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. Governments in these 
countries, which until recently in various ways and with differing levels of intensity 
welcomed immigrants and even invited them to settle and allowed or encouraged 
them to establish their own institutions, shifted gears to embark on restrictive immi-
gration and tougher integration policies, placing increasing emphasis on native 
norms, values, and behavior and on disciplining the “Other.” The “new realism” that 
has informed this shift has been accompanied by fierce criticism of the “ethnic 
minorities industry,” i.e., the self-proclaimed leadership of immigrant ethnic and 
religious minorities, the native white advocates of multiculturalism, as well as their 
institutions. In so doing, the political leadership felt it ought to respond to the smol-
dering discontent among parts of the native white population and to the plethora 
of populist, anti-immigrant parties that had so successfully won the hearts of the 
discontented. In several cases, including Austria, Denmark, and the Netherlands, 
these parties even managed to become part of or closely associated with the ruling 
government. Although bigots, racists, fascists, and neo-Nazis gravitate to these radi-
cal parties, it would be too simple to say that each and every supporter is a neo-
Nazi in disguise.
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What, then, is happening in Europe nowadays? Has Europe been taken hostage 
by a bunch of twisted political entrepreneurs who have lost their minds, forgotten 
the lessons of 1933-1945 and the holocaust, and who are trying to gain political 
influence by trampling on immigrant ethnic and religious minorities? Or is it that 
Europeans have been too naive with regard to accepting individuals and groups from 
countries that are —or are seen as— culturally distant from the imagined national 
centers? Or should the current political mood be explained as a reaction to the poli-
tics of obstinate, left-wing lunatics and prophets of boundless multiculturalism?
There are no easy answers. In practice, things are much more complicated than 
popular wisdom suggests, and a wider perspective is needed to fully comprehend the 
current developments. Let us briefly examine a number of aspects.
First of all, it remains to be seen that we are dealing with a uniquely European 
situation. The rise of populist political movements that capitalize on anti-immi-
grant, anti-multicultural, and anti-government sentiments, religious fundamental-
ism, and narrow-minded nationalism can also be observed elsewhere. Take the 
United States. The recent immigration enforcement legislation in Arizona, the rise 
of the Tea Party with their swipes at minorities, and some of the recent electoral 
campaigns only serve to demonstrate that Europe is not alone. Australia, a country 
once notorious for its White Australian policy in days of yore, shifted to multicul-
turalism in the 1970s, but had already abolished its unconditional embrace of 
multiculturalism by the 1990s. This coincided with the rise of Pauline Hanson’s 
One Nation party. Mrs. Hanson was by no means a friend of immigration and 
diversity. She was quoted as saying, “I believe we are in danger of being swamped 
by Asians,” and, “Of course, I will be called racist but, if I can invite whom I want 
into my home, then I should have the right to have a say in who comes into my 
country,” and she complained constantly about “reverse racism” and “political cor-
rectness” (The Australian 2010). One Nation never constituted a government, but 
her influence was unarguably huge. Since the 1990s, Australia has been advocat-
ing the idea of a “shared national identity’ (with a remarkably high appreciation of 
the Anglo-Celtic heritage). Canada has treasured the public acceptance of ethnic 
and religious difference and support of cultural pluralism as a core element of its 
identity since the early 1970s. But Canada, too, hit upon the limits of multicultur-
alism, and the call for what has euphemistically come to be known as “reasonable 
accommodation” resounds loudly in the public realm today. It is unarguably true 
that these “classical countries of immigration” are more inclined to accept immigra-
tion as a fact of life and are not shocked when newcomers constitute ethnic 
enclaves. In that sense, everything is relative. For cultural backlash is everywhere 
and certainly not confined to Europe.
Secondly, it also remains to be seen that we are witnessing a rise of concerns 
about immigration and cultural, ethnic, and religious diversity. As early as 1968, 
134 JAN RATH
the British Conservative leader Enoch Powell made a rather controversial speech 
in which he warned against “rivers of blood” due to what he saw as the continued 
unchecked immigration from the Commonwealth to Britain and the “race-relations 
problems” subsequent to that. His speech with its open appeal to racial hatred was 
declared “evil” at the time, but it inspired Margaret Thatcher (who had become 
prime minister shortly afterwards) to use the gist of his argument for her immigra-
tion and race-relations policies. A noteworthy side-effect was that by adopting a 
strong position, Thatcher stole the National Front’s thunder, resulting in the demise 
of this racist party and a further rise of the Tory Party. In France, maverick politician 
Jean Marie Le Pen rose to prominence in the 1980s. He gained widespread popu-
larity with his nationalist, anti-immigration platform. The very fact that he repeat-
edly denied the holocaust and put anti-Semitic slurs on Jewish politicians did not 
prevent numerous French voters from supporting him as candidate for the posi-
tion of président de la république. Other politicians tried to take the wind out of Le 
Pen’s sails by reaching out to xenophobic voters. In 1989, President Mitterrand said, 
“Il y a un seuil de tolérance” (there is a threshold of tolerance), implying that immi-
grants were a nuisance indeed and that the proportion of immigrants present in a 
population had to be minimized. Jacques Chirac joined this lamentation by com-
plaining about “du bruit et des odeurs” (the noises and the smells) generated by 
African immigrants. Many voters grasped the message only too well. In Austria, Jörg 
Haider was a successful regional politician before he joined the national govern-
ment in 2000. He was notorious for his offensive statements about immigration 
and immigrants, Muslim immigrants in particular, whose attitude and behavior 
were in his eyes incompatible with “Western” ones. In other countries, including 
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany, similar political situations arose. Peculiarly 
enough, many observers have a rather short memory when it comes to these mat-
ters. In the Netherlands, the country that likes to cherish the self-image of toler-
ance and the live-and-let-live mentality, it is often claimed that problematizing 
immigration and multiculturalism was not PC until very recently. The government 
pursued a multicultural policy —so it is believed— but not one single individual 
dared make any critical comment. Apart from the fact that the Netherlands never 
pursued such a policy —at best it paid lip service to the maintenance of ethnic and 
religious difference—, the critics apparently failed to notice the intense media 
debates in the early 1980s, or the election of dozens of racist politicians to Par lia-
ment and local councils since the early 1980s. Perhaps they were beamed up to the 
Starship Enterprise during these spectacular events. What is relevant here is that 
concerns about immigration and diversity have been voiced for quite a long time. 
So, what else is new?
Thirdly, discussions about immigrant ethnic and religious minorities and their 
relations with the mainstream are often dogged by explicit or implicit references to 
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Europe’s Judeo-Christian tradition and its incompatibility with that of immigrants. 
Immigrants from Muslim traditions in particular are supposedly incapable of 
embracing modern norms, values, and behavior, and have little or no understanding 
of democracy, gender equality, acceptance of homosexuality, and so forth. (This 
argument is never used in reference to highly-skilled and wealthy immigrants from 
Japan or visitors from the Vatican.) These references, however, are not unprob-
lematic. To the extent that such a tradition exists, there is a lot to be said against 
it. It was in the name of Christianity that soldiers and tradesmen sailed the ocean 
in sunshine, wind, and rain to conquer the rest of the world. Trade wars, looting, 
slavery, and colonial exploitation were only a few of the blessings of the Judeo-
Christian tradition. The Judeo-Christian tradition, moreover, could not prevent 
two world wars, nor the holocaust, nor the troubles in Northern Ireland, nor the 
mass expulsion of Roma from France. References to the Judeo-Christian tradi-
tion, furthermore, fail to appreciate the fact that Europe is rapidly secularizing, or 
that people of other religions or cultures have historically been subjects of Europe’s 
nation-states. Islam is often regarded as an immigrant religion, as something entire-
ly new, but this obscures the historical presence of indigenous Muslims in Eastern 
Europe or the presence of Muslims in (former) colonial areas. The United Kingdom, 
the French republic and the kingdom of the Netherlands ruled many millions of 
Muslims in the Middle East, Northern Africa, India and Pakistan, and Indonesia. 
But even if we imagined a Europe without Muslims —a purely theoretical exercise 
of course, just for the sake of argument—, we would find immense internal diver-
sity. Those who refer to the Judeo-Christian tradition may pretend that Europe is a 
cultural unit existing within clear-cut boundaries, but the opposite is true. In fact, 
all references to this tradition mainly serve the construction of Europe as a coherent 
and cohesive unit.
Fourthly, discussions about the ethnic or religious Other always pertain to 
fixed imaginary categories. The category of Muslims, then, invariably encompasses 
men with long beards in white dresses, silenced women with head scarves or bur-
kas, and agitated young men who make anti-Semitic statements about Jews and 
Israel and abuse homosexuals. All Muslim immigrants are supposedly ignorant 
people with insufficient proficiency in the host country’s language, people with 
unskilled jobs —if they are employed at all—, and people who live in inner-city 
working class areas or the banlieues, people who, in the words of the Somali anti-
Muslim and anti-multiculturalism activist Ayaan Hirsi Ali, never read the famous 
works of Voltaire, in short, folks who do not conform to mainstream norms, values, 
attitudes, who failed to notice the Enlightenment, who missed the boat to moder-
nity, and who live parallel lives. Sure enough, those people do exist. But there are 
numerous other Muslim immigrants who do not conform to these inane stereotypes. 
In fact, the overwhelming majority of “Muslims” in Europe never visit a mosque 
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and do not feel represented by the unworldly imams that journalists are so crazy about. 
Likewise, something like a cohesive “Muslim community,” to be sure, does not 
actually exist. Muslims in Europe, like all ordinary people, come in all shapes and 
sizes. They come from different countries, have different migration histories, differ-
ent levels of education, different class positions, live in different neighborhoods, 
and have different political loyalties, life styles, and religious and ethnic identities and 
feelings of belonging. What’s more, these differences are utterly dynamic; they 
change continuously, partly under the influence of the specific context in which 
they live, and this leads to ever more variety. Talking about “the” Muslims or about “the” 
ethnic minorities, therefore, is increasingly out of sync with everyday reality. 
Fifthly, something always seems to be overlooked in these kinds of discus-
sions. There is a more fundamental but rather general discontentment in Europe 
about the role of the state, the welfare state in particular, and about the elites who 
have been ruling the country and created the situation that we are now in. For sev-
eral decades, Europe has been pursuing a neo-liberal course. Competitiveness and 
economic growth were to be boosted by giving more space to the business sector 
and by organizing society as if it were a private enterprise. Welfare-state provisions 
were considered acceptable as long as they served these goals. Since the 1980s and 
1990s, all European countries have deregulated the economy and dismantled the 
welfare state, leading to ever more precarious labor market conditions. Also, a 
plethora of services once offered by the state or by institutions operating under the 
aegis of the state have been privatized. So, health care, postal and telephone ser-
vices, public utilities such as gas, water, and electricity, public transportation, etc., are 
now available on the private market. So far, so good. The pundits of neo-liberalism 
slap one another on the back, but numerous consumers —oh, excuse me— citizens 
fail to acknowledge the blessings of this system: the costs of health care have been 
soaring, while fewer services have been made available; the telephone market has 
become hopelessly non-transparent; public transportation has gone downhill; and so 
forth. More fundamentally, the overall quality of the public sector has seriously dete-
riorated both in terms of services offered to the public and in terms of qual ity of work-
ing conditions for civil servants. As for the latter, the introduction of output-driven 
quality-control systems has increased red tape with a rising number of “managers” in 
a position of control, and de-professionalization looms large. The mindless liberal-
ization of the economy, the impudent pursuit of self-interest, and the perplexing lack 
of public responsibility and accountability eventually resulted in the current eco-
nomic crisis . . . and Joe the Plummer is expected to pay the bill. People expect the 
state to take care of them, but many feel abandoned.
Those who find themselves —rightly or wrongly— on the wrong side of the 
tracks, are keen to point out the culprit. And there they are: immigrants and the elite. 
As for the latter, the economic elite have been too busy going for profit; the cultural 
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elite have been on their own in lofty artistic spheres, splashing taxpayers’ money 
on their own hobbies; the scientific elite —the social sciences in particular— have 
lost touch with Joe’s reality; the political elite are bickering all the time, indulging 
in inanities instead of addressing “real” problems. This slanted representation of 
reality has been propelled by a media industry that is continuously on the lookout 
for a scoop and a scandal. At this moment, it is easy and rewarding to make a lot of 
fuss about minorities with little political clout. Moderate local politicians, part 
of the cursed political elite, are keen to show their credentials to Joe the Plummer. 
Some, like the deputy mayor of The Hague, Marnix Norder, talk about a “tsunami 
of immigrants,” referring to labor migrants from EU-member-state Poland, as a 
means of putting political pressure on the central government for more funding. But 
in so doing, they are reproducing unfounded suggestions of uncontrollability and 
irreparable damage. In this political climate, one can easily get the impression that 
a Turkish girl’s head scarf is a serious problem, while the fact that she dropped out 
of high school, is excluded from the labor market, and cannot develop her talents 
to the interest of herself or of society at large is seen as less relevant. For to the extent 
that there is a cultural backlash in Europe, it is about fear and the lack of social 
security of mainstream people; it is against the cultural, economic, and political elites 
who are regarded as responsible for this; and it is manifested by using politically 
weak minority groups as a convenient scapegoat.
Last, but not least, while there is a lot of fuss about a “cultural backlash,” a 
miracle is slowly and surely taking shape: ethnic and cultural diversity is becoming 
commonplace in Europe. In the Netherlands, for instance, while the government 
was considering banning headscarves in public spaces, the biggest supermarket 
chain, Albert Heijn, introduced headscarves for the thousands of Turkish, Mo ro c-
can, and Pakistani girls and women working as cashiers. They wear the head-
scarves —in the company color, of course: blue— when they sit behind the cash 
registers, and nobody has ever bothered about it. Also in the Netherlands, in cities 
like Amsterdam and Rotterdam, the most popular local radio station, FunX, broad-
casts what is called “an urban program,” i.e., a program that reaches out to all ethnic 
and religious minorities by playing different styles of music and talking about the 
things that matter for all youngsters, regardless of their ethnic or religious back-
ground: school, finding a job, politics, shopping, dating, and so forth. And again in 
the Netherlands, restaurants, fashion, home decorating, sports, and so forth are all 
thriving thanks to ethnic influences: ethnic food, clothing, and gadgets sell (Aytar 
and Rath 2012; Rath 2007). Despite complaints about immigration and diversity, 
and despite integrationist or assimilationist discourses, “multiculturalism by 
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